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Abstract 
One of the reasons of trend of labor shares declining which is widespread phenomena in 
OECD countries is that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is likely to 
be enlarging in the medium-run and long-run. Although there are debates about the value 
of this elasticity larger than unity or not in the macroeconomy, the level and the 
movements of this value may differ in the industry-level in each advanced country. These 
heterogeneities come from its own industry-specific and country-specific reasons such as 
the institutional changes, technological changes, globalization and the structural change. 
In this paper, focusing on the time series data from 2001 to 2017 in manufacturing and 
services industries in the U.S. and Japanese economy, we estimate the trends and the 
movements of the elasticities of substitution, compare them and investigate the reasons. 
We have the following findings. In both countries, the trend in the elasticity of 
substitution in the macroeconomy is almost likely to rise from 2001 to 2017, and the 
magnitude of this value, especially in the manufacturing industries in the U.S. economy 
is almost larger than that in Japanese economy. However, although the values in service 
sector such as retail trade are likely to be larger in the U.S. economy, the values in these 
sectors in Japanese economy are not always likely to be large. Our findings suggest that 
these trends can provide the difference of the declining labor shares in both countries, 
and the analysis implies that these trends can be mainly produced by the new technologies 
such as information and communication technology and substitution of computer-intensive 
machinery for workers and the structural change such as rising service sectors and declining 
manufacturing sectors. 
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1. Introduction  
One of the reasons of trend in labor shares declining which is widespread phenomena in 
OECD countries is that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is likely to 
be enlarging in the medium-run and long-run. Although there are debates about the value 
of this elasticity larger than unity or not in the macroeconomy, 2  the level and the 
movements of this value differ in the industry-level in each advanced country. These 
heterogeneities come from its own industry-specific and country-specific reasons such as 
the institutional changes, technological changes such as computerization, globalization 
and the structural change such as rising service sectors and declining the manufacturing. 
Focusing on the time series data from 2001 to 2017 in the manufacturing and services 
industries, we estimate the trends and the movements of the elasticities of substitution, 
compare them and investigate the reasons. In particular, focusing on the ten-year average 
series data in the motor vehicles manufacturing and the retail trade sector in the U.S. and 
Japanese economy, we analyze the medium-run trend in the elasticity of substitution in 
both countries from the millennium age.  
Figure 1 and Table 1 show two movements of labor shares in the retail trade and motor 
vehicles manufacturing in the US and Japan from 2001-2017. First shows that the trends 
in labor shares in both retail trade and motor vehicles industries in both countries are 
likely to be declining although the labor shares in the motor vehicle industries 
countercyclically move during the Great Recession in both countries. The second shows 
that these indicate that the levels in labor shares in Japan tend to be constantly higher 
than in the US. Investigating the dynamics of industry-specific elasticity of substitution 
in the US and Japan, we analyze these trend and movement of such labor shares in the US 
and Japanese economy.3 
We have two main findings. First, in both industries, the trend in the elasticity of 
substitution in the US economy indicates that the average elasticity of substitution tends 
to be larger than that in Japanese economy. In particular, the value of elasticity of 
substitution in the US economy is likely to be larger than unity, but the average elasticity 
of substitution in Japanese economy is likely to be lower than unity. This finding suggests 
that these trends can provide one of the reasons for larger declining labor shares in the 
US than that in Japan.4  
Second, the movement of elasticity of substitution has the industry-specific feature in 
both countries, particularly after the great recession. Specifically, after the Lehman shock, 
the elasticity of substitution in the US motor vehicles industry tends to be large and to 
fluctuate more. In contrast, the elasticity of substitution in the Japanese retail trade tend 
to become larger and to fluctuate more.  
                                                     
2 For example, Klump et al. (2007), Oberfield and Raval (2014), Laurence (2015), Chirinko and 
Mallick (2017) provide the estimation of the elasticity of substitution less than unity. 
Conversely, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Piketty (2014) provide the estimation of 
this elasticity larger than unity. Recently IMF (2017) estimates the elasticity of substitution in 
the advanced economies larger than unity, while that in the emerging and developing 
economies less than unity. 
3 Alternatively, there are a lot of research for the concentration of industry and market for 
analyzing capital shares and labor shares. See Bartelesman et al. (2013), Autor et al. (2017), 
De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017). 
4 Hirakata and Koike (2018) obtain the similar results. However, their framework differs from 
ours. 
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These findings suggest that these trend and movements of such elasticity of substitution 
may be produced by not only the business cycle but also the new technologies such as 
information and communication technology and substitution of computer-intensive 
machinery for workers, mainly in the US, and moreover the structural changes and 
globalization 5  such as the declining manufacturing mainly in the US 6 and the rising 
service sector due to restructuring and merger in retail trade sectors mainly in Japan. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides Data, and Section 3 presents 
the results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data 
Following Kendrick and Sato (1963), Sato (1970), Sato and Morita (2009), we formulate the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor σ as follows: 7 
σ =(𝐺𝐺𝐾𝐾 − 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿) (𝐺𝐺𝑤𝑤−𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟⁄ ),                                       (1) 
where GK represents the rate of change of capital stock, GL the rate of change of labor force, Gw 
the rate of change of wage rate, Gr the rate of change of rate of return on capital. In our 
formulation, we have some notes. First, it is not crucial whether the remuneration rates are 
competitively determined or not in the medium-run and long-run unless the elasticities of factor 
demands with respect to remuneration rates do not change. This is because the elasticity of 
substitution depends on the rate of change of the relative ratio of remuneration rates d(w/r)/(w/r) 
= Gw – Gr, Also, because of the same reason, it is not significant whether the remuneration rates 
are evaluated by the nominal rate or not. We later use the nominal rate of Gw and Gr. Second, our 
formulation implies that the technical progress is total factor productivity type, in other words, 
Hicks neutral one.8 If each factor-augmenting technical progress differs, the formulation may 
change.9 
To measure the rate of change of capital stock GK, the rate of change of labor force GL, the rate 
of change of wage rate Gw, and the rate of change of rate of return on capital Gr in the retail trade 
sector and motor vehicles manufacturing sector in the US and Japan, we mainly use data from the 
US Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Japanese Financial Statements Statistics of 
Corporations by Industry issued by the Japanese Ministry of Finance annually. For labor force, 
we use data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Japan Main Productivity-Indicator 
Database issued by Japan Productivity Center. Specifically, we use these data for 2001-2017 by 
taking the ten-year average. 
We calculate the rate of change of wage rate Gw and the rate of change of the rate of return on 
                                                     
5 See Bliss (2007) and Bourguignon (2015).  
6 See Baily and Bosworth (2014).  
7 See also Hicks (1963).  
8 Our production function is assumed to be of Y = TF (K, L) where T is Hicks neutral technical 
progress. 
9 This means that if the production function to be of Y= F(BK, AL), the elasticity of substitution 
modifies into the following : σ = (GB – GA + GK – GL)/(GB – GA + Gw – Gr) where GA represents 
labor-augmenting technical progress and GB capital-augmenting technical progress. See also 
Sato and Morita (2009). However, based on this formulation, we have the identification 
problem. For the identification problem, see Diamond et al. (1978). 
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capital Gr in each sector as follows. First, to measure the rate of change of wage rate Gw in each 
sector, we calculate the rate of change of wage income GwL, which consists of employees' 
compensation in the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and salaries and wages plus directors' 
remuneration plus welfare expense in the Japanese Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations 
by Industry. Second, we calculate the rate of change of labor force GL from US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the Japan Main Productivity-Indicator Database. Finally, the rate of change of wage 
rate is the rate of change of wage income minus the rate of change of labor force; thus Gw = GwL 
– GL. Similarly, we can calculate the rate of change of the rate of return on capital Gr. First, we 
calculate the rate of change of capital income GrK from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and 
the Japanese Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations. Then, we calculate the rate of change 
of capital stock GK from the same data. Finally, we have the rate of change of rate of return on 
capital is the rate of change of capital income minus the rate of change of capital stock; thus Gr = 
GrK – GK. Note that Gw and Gr are respectively based on the rate of change at the nominal rate. 
However, it does not matter because the elasticity of substitution depends only on the relative 
change of the remuneration ratio. 
Table 2 and 3 show each ten-year average of the rate of change of wage rate Gw, the rate of 
change of rate of return on capital Gr, the rate of change of capital stock GK, the rate of change of 
labor force GL, and the elasticity of substitution σ in the retail trade sector and motor vehicles 
manufacturing sector in the US and Japan in the recent decades. 𝜎𝜎� indicates the arithmetic mean 
of σ in each sector. 
The next section shows the main findings. 
 
 
3. Results 
From Table 2 and 3, we have two main findings of the trend and movements of the 
elasticity of substitution in each sector in the US and Japan. First, about the trend in the 
elasticity of substitution in both industries, the average elasticity of substitution in the US 
tends to be larger than that in Japanese economy. In particular, the value of elasticity of 
substitution in the US economy is likely to be larger than unity, but the average elasticity 
of substitution in Japanese economy is likely to be lower than unity. 10 Specifically, 
during 2001-2017 in the US economy, the average elasticity of substitution in the retail 
trade is 1.463 and that in the motor vehicles 1.497. On the other hand, during the same 
decades in Japan, the average elasticity of substitution in the retail trade is 0.941 and that 
in the motor vehicles 0.162. This finding suggests that these trends can provide one of the 
reasons for larger declining labor shares in the US than that in Japan. 
One of the reasons for the behavior of the larger elasticity of substitution in the US 
comes from the more advancement of new technologies such as substitution of computer-
intensive machinery for workers and information and communication technology (ICT) and 
the deregulation produced by globalization of financial and commodity markets.11 Besides, as in 
such a retail trade sector, the increase in the rate of return on capital and the decrease in capital 
may reflect the merger in this industry and the concentration of large firm and the market. These 
                                                     
10 As noted, Hirakata and Koike (2018) obtain the similar results. Their estimates indicate that 
during the three decades 1985-2017, the elasticity of the substitution at the mean in the US is 
1.475, while that in Japan is 0.199. 
11 See Bliss (2007) and Bourguignon (2015).  
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are other reasons for decreasing labor share in the US.12 On the other hands, the possible 
reason for smaller elasticity of substitution in Japan comes from a prolonged stagnation13  
that implies the slow adjustment to the business recovery. However, even if the elasticity 
of substitution is below unity, Japanese economy has the labor share declining. This may 
imply that other reasons such as lack of aggregate demand, low productivity in supply 
side, and labor market deregulation are significant. 14  However, the elasticities of 
substitution in both sectors are getting larger although the motor vehicles are hit in the 
great recession. These come from the slow recovery, the advancement of the new 
technology, the globalization of financial and commodity market, the merger of the retail 
sector 
Second, the movement of elasticity of substitution has the industry-specific feature in 
both countries, particularly after the great recession. Specifically, after the Lehman shock, 
the elasticity of substitution in the US motor vehicles industry tends to be large and to 
fluctuate more. In contrast, the elasticity of substitution in the Japanese retail trade tend 
to become larger and to fluctuate more. In both countries, these features come from the 
structural change and the great recession. In the US, in the motor vehicle industries, the 
decrease in rate of return on capital and the decrease in employment reflect the declining 
of motor vehicle industries implying the declining of the US manufacturing. 15  
On the other hands, In Japan, the decrease in wages and employment in the retail sector 
reflect the merger and restructure of the industry produced by the advancement of new 
technology such as computer intensive machinery and ICT network and globalization, 
implying the relatively rising the service sectors.  
In summary, these findings suggest that these trend and movements of such elasticity 
of substitution may be produced by not only the business cycle but also the new 
technologies such as information and communication technology and substitution of 
computer-intensive machinery for workers, and moreover the structural changes and 
globalization such as the declining manufacturing mainly in the US and the rising service 
sector due to restructuring and merger in retail trade sectors mainly in Japan. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Focusing on the ten-year average series data in the motor vehicles manufacturing and the 
retail trade sector in the U.S. and Japanese economy from 2001 to 2017, we analyzed the 
medium-run trend and movement in the elasticity of substitution in both countries. We 
showed that in both industries, the value of elasticity of substitution in the US economy 
is likely to be larger than unity, while the average elasticity of substitution in Japanese 
economy is likely to be lower than unity. We also showed that the movement of elasticity 
of substitution has the industry-specific feature, particularly after the Lehman shock, the 
elasticity of substitution in the US motor vehicles industry tends to be large and to 
fluctuate more. In contrast, the elasticity of substitution in the Japanese retail trade tend 
to become larger and to fluctuate more. These implies that the trend and movements of 
such elasticity of substitution may be produced by not only the business cycle but also 
                                                     
12 See Autor et al. (2017), and De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017). 
13 See Teulings and Baldwin (2014). 
14 See Fukao and Pergini (2018). 
15 See Baily and Bosworth (2014).  
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the new technologies, and moreover the structural changes such as the declining 
manufacturing mainly in the US and the rising service sector in retail trade sectors mainly 
in Japan. However, the empirical analysis in the more profound data are needed and the 
widespread data analysis across OECD countries are also required. These are to be deal with in 
the future research. 
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Table 1: Labor Share: Retail Trade Sector and Motor Vehicles in the U.S. and Japan 
 
 Labor Share 
 Retail Trade (US) Retail Trade (Japan) Motor Vehicles (US) Motor Vehicles (Japan) 
2001 0.499 0.764 0.587 0.707 
2002 0.490 0.707 0.546 0.683 
2003 0.477 0.710 0.528 0.700 
2004 0.478 0.727 0.548 0.707 
2005 0.467 0.706 0.554 0.675 
2006 0.468 0.735 0.562 0.680 
200o7 0.483 0.709 0.580 0.669 
2008 0.488 0.727 0.705 1 
2009 0.475 0.708 1 0.931 
2010 0.468 0.707 0.548 0.831 
2011 0.471 0.671 0.504 0.869 
2012 0.470 0.681 0.493 0.744 
2013 0.460 0.673 0.483 0.639 
2014 0.468 0.693 0.490 0.659 
2015 0.471 0.679 0.480 0.666 
2016 0.470 0.697 0.472 0.715 
2017 0.470 0.683 0.477 0.672 
 
Sources: US: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Japan: Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by 
Industry 
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Figure 1 
Labor Share: Retail Trade in the U.S. and Japan 
 
 
 
Labor Share: Motor Vehicles in the U.S. and Japan 
 
 
Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by 
Industry 
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Table 2: Sigma σ (= (GK – GL)/(Gw – Gr)): Retail Trade in the U.S. and Japan 
 
Retail Trade (US) 
 Gw Gr GK GL σ 
2001-2011 1.923 0.217 2.422 -0.426 1.669 
2002-2012 1.992 1.541 1.042 -0.259 2.882 
2003-2013 1.869 0.109 2.339 -0.115 1.394 
2004-2014 1.884 0.295 1.926 -0.042 1.239 
2005-2015 2.009 3.766 -1.893 0.059 1.111 
2006-2016 1.899 8.303 -6.433 0.073 1.016 
2007-2017 1.796 9.320 -6.808 0.191 0.930 
     𝝈𝝈� = 1.463 
 
 
Retail Trade (Japan) 
 Gw Gr GK GL σ 
2001-2011 -0.564 5.399 -1.813 -0.529 0.215 
2002-2012 -1.529 1.037 -1.776 -0.39 0.540 
2003-2013 -1.382 2.994 -3.023 -0.362 0.608 
2004-2014 1.029 3.653 -1.312 -0.393 0.350 
2005-2015 0.747 0.332 1.531 -0.237 4.259 
2006-2016 -0.987 -0.356 1.049 -0.167 -1.925 
2007-2017 0.886 0.084 1.993 -0.049 2.541 
     𝝈𝝈� = 0.941 
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Table 3: Sigma σ (= (GK – GL)/(Gw – Gr)): Motor Vehicles in the U.S. and Japan 
 
Motor Vehicles (US) 
 Gw Gr GK GL σ 
2001-2011 1.436 -4.931 4.940 -4.718 1.517 
2002-2012 0.916 -5.710 5.220 -3.496 1.315 
2003-2013 0.280 -6.932 6.309 -2.678 1.246 
2004-2014 0.511 -3.151 3.845 -2.134 1.633 
2005-2015 0.625 -0.559 2.808 -1.38 3.536 
2006-2016 0.286 -1.682 4.978 -0.679 2.876 
2007-2017 0.366 1.973 2.730 0.087 -1.645 
     𝝈𝝈� = 1.497 
 
 
 
Motor Vehicles (Japan) 
 Gw Gr GK GL σ 
2001-2011 1.938 -9.203 1.433 0.128 0.117 
2002-2012 1.497 -2.098 1.268 0.652 0.171 
2003-2013 0.235 2.759 0.849 0.536 -0.124 
2004-2014 0.555 2.926 0.334 0.435 0.042 
2005-2015 0.803 1.223 0.286 0.315 0.069 
2006-2016 0.974 -1.094 0.465 0.070 0.191 
2007-2017 0.886 0.445 0.583 0.287 0.669 
     𝝈𝝈� = 0.162 
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